O FMI tornou pública uma avaliação à sua própria atuação na crise económica grega, junto da qual interveio em conjunto com o BCE e a Comissão Europeia formando a Troika. Do balanço resultam aspetos positivos mas destacamos, pela singularidade e caráter revelador, os erros. Pode aceder à avaliação aqui: Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement. Aguarda-se com curiosidade a reação dos restantes elementos que compõem a troika e claro, avaliações simulares relativas a outros países intervencionados. Um excerto:
“(…) However, there were also notable failures. Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30 percent of its deposits, and the economy encountered a muchdeeper-than-expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment. Public debt remained too high and eventually had to be restructured, with collateral damage for bank balance sheets that were also weakened by the recession. Competitiveness improved somewhat on the back of falling wages, but structural reforms stalled and productivity gains proved elusive.
Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the program to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability. There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access). In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programs. In the event, macro outcomes were far below the baseline and while some of this was due to exogenous factors, the baseline macro projections can also be criticized for being too optimistic.
The report considers the broad thrust of policies under the program to have been appropriate. Rapid fiscal adjustment was unavoidable given that the Greece had lost market access and official financing was as large as politically feasible. Competiveness boosting measures were also essential, as were fiscal structural reforms to support deficit reduction. However, the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated.
Greece’s SBA suggests the need to explore the case for refining the Fund’s lending policies and framework to better accommodate the circumstances of monetary unions.
A particular challenge is to find ways to translate promises of conditional assistance from partner countries into formal program agreements.
There are also political economy lessons to be learned. Greece’s recent experience demonstrates the importance of spreading the burden of adjustment across different strata of society in order to build support for a program. The obstacles encountered in implementing reforms also illustrate the critical importance of ownership of a program, a lesson that is common to the findings of many previous EPEs.
Other lessons drawn concern the need to find ways to streamline the Troika process in the future and for Fund staff to be more skeptical about official data during regular surveillance. The detailed nature of the structural fiscal conditionality in the Greek program also bears scrutiny given the premium attached to parsimony in Fund conditionality. (…)”